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The Second Best Theory of Capital Taxation
ABSTRACT
An important proposition in the theory of efficient taxation is that, if
capital income is taxed, all types of capital income should be taxed at the same
rate. This conclusion has motivated extensive empirical analysis of the tax
rates on different types of capital income. It has also been the basis for a
variety of proposals to revise actual tax rules.
The present paper emphasizes that the comventional view must be modified in
the very common situation in which some capital tax rate is politically
constrained to something other than its optimal value, e.g., the zero rates on
the imputed income on owner-occupied housing. The formal analysis of the paper
examines the case in which there are three types of capital income and one of
the tax rates is arbitrarily constrained to be zero.
Three general "rule of thumb" results emerge from the specific analysis:
First, if the several types of capital can be regarded as independent in produc-
tion, the optimal tax rates on the taxable types of capital income should depart
from equality in the direction of an inverse elasticity rule. Second, in com-
parison to these rates, capital that is a complement to the untaxed capital
should generally be taxed more heavily while capital that is a substitute for
the untaxed capital should be taxed less heavily. Third, variations in the
degree of complementarity or substitutability between the two types of capital
should alter the two tax rates in a way that maintains a constant difference in
the total taxes on each type of capital.
Although these rule-of-thumb results help to modify the conventional equal-
tax—rates rule in an appropriate way, the most important implication of the pre-
sent analysis is that any departure from optimal taxation makes it very
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A fundamental principle of optimal tax theory is that production efficiency
should be maintained (e.g., Diamond and Plirrlees, 1971). If lump-sum taxation
Is not feasible, all taxes should be levied on factor Incomes or on the
consumption of different goods. Explicitly precluded is the differential
taxation of the inputs of firms.
As specific applications of this principle, studies have estimated the
welfare costs of taxing capital differently in different uses. Individual
studies include the excess burden of the corporate incometax(Harberger, 1964;
Shoven and Whalley, 1972), of the differential taxation of equipment, structures and
Inventories (King and Fullerton, 1984; Auerbach, 1979). and of the lack of
taxation of the Implicit income produced by owner—occupied housing (Laidler,
1969; Aaron, 1972). In the recent tax reform debate in the United States, the
Treasury (U.S. Treasury, 1984, 1985) has emphasized the existing disparities in
capital income tax rates among industries and types of capital investments and
has proposedchanges designedto reduce these disparities.
Experience nevertheless suggests that governments will continue to use
suboptimal tax policies. It Is significant that even the initial "radical
reform" proposals of the U.S. Treasury (1984) did not suggest taxing the
implicit income of owner-occupied housing capital or eliminating the corporate
income tax or taxing the interest on general purpose bonds issued by state and
1Professor of Economics, Harvard University, and President, National
Bureau of Economic Research. The paper is part of the NBER Study of the
Effects of Taxation on Capital Formation.—2-
local governments. Although it is useful to derive the optimal tax rules that
should guide a benevolent and politically unconstrained government, we also need
a firmer base for prescribing piecemeal improvements when tax policy is
restricted by suboptimal constraints.2 For example, if political constraints
make it impossible to tax the implicit Income on owner-occupied housing, should
other types of capital income still be taxed at equal rates with the aim of
assuring production •ffici.ncy in the rest of the economy? If not, what
principle should guide the relative tax rates on the other types of capital
income?
There has been surprisingly little attention to the issue of second best
factor taxation in general or to the second best differential taxation of
capital income in particular. The one noticeable exception is an important but
little heeded paper by Auerbach (1979) in which he shows that in general it Is
not optimal to tax all types of capital equally if some other condition of
optimal fiscal policy is not satisfied. Auerbech analyzes two significant cases
in which different types of capital should be taxed at different rates: first,
when the government does not have the instruments needed tobring the economyto
the golden rule level of capital intensity3 and second, when the tax rate on
laborIncome isnot set optimally.
Auerbach'sanalysis assumes that the government is free to set an optimal
taxrate on each kind of capital income. His results are therefore not directly
20n the equal theory of piecemeal reform, see Bruno (1972) and Guesnerie
(1977).
3This is described by Auerbach and others as a limitation on government
debt activity although in reality the necessary level of the government debt
would be negative. That Is, the government would have to be a creditor to
increase the nation's total capital stock to the golden rule level.-3—
relevant to the question of how capital tax rates should be set when
owner-occupied housing or interest on state and localgovernmentsecurities Is
untaxed or corporate capital is subject to an additional tax. When such
constraints are Imposed, how should the tax rates be set on capital invested in
different sectors or in different types of capital assets? When investment in
owner-occupied residences is untaxed, should business investment in housing be
taxedatthe same rate as all other types of business investment? When
structures used for owner-occupied housing bear no tax, should other structures
be taxed at the same rate as equipment and inventories? Several studies of the
inefficiency of existing tax rules4 assume that the answer to these and other
such questions is yes. The present paper will show that the opposite is true.
The analysis here is related to the studies of second-best excise taxation
(see Green, 1961 and Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). In his classic study, Green
(1961) derived the optimal tax rates on n-i consumer goods when the tax rate on
the n-th good Is constrained to be some arbitrary value. Since the
government In Green's analysis can also use lump-sum taxes and transfers, the
optimal tax rates on all n goods would be zero if there were no constraint.
Green showed that the constraint implies that the remaining n-i tax rates
should not be equal but should differ according to the complementarity or
substitutability of the goods with leisure and with the n-th good. When the
government does not have a lump sum tax as an option, the unconstrained
optimum for the n tax rates (or for any available subset of rates) satisfies
4Auerbach's (1983) analysis of the welfare cost of the differential
taxation of different types of business capital ignores his own earlier
conclusions about the inappropriateness of taxin9 all capital equally when the
economy is not at the golden rule level of capital intensity. See also
Fullerton and Henderson (1984) and U.S. Treasury (1984,1985).—4-
the rules derived by Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Hirrlees (1971) and others.
In the present paper, I look at the problem of setting optimal tax rates on
n—i types of capital Income whenthetax rate on the n-th typeofcapital Income
Is arbitrarily set equaltozero. To focus on the optimal allocation of the
capital stock, I Ignore the problem of labor supply and intertemporal capital
accumulation.5 I assume fixed supplies of labor and capital and a fixed amount
of tax that must be raised by taxing capital income.Inthis context, if all
tax rates could be set optimally, it would be optimal to tax all types of
capital equally. The analysis showsthatconstraining the tax rate on one type
of capital to be zero implies that in general the other tax rates should no
longer be equal. An explicit expression for those tax rates is derived end
interpreted.
1.OptImal Tax Rates on Capital Income
The economy produces aggregate output (X) using three types of capital
p5.'K,and 1(3) and labor (1) according to the production function
(1.1)X —F(K1,2' K3 1).
Labor income is untaxed and the government must raise total revenue R by
taxing the three typesofcapital income.Ifall types of capital income can




5Thls focus is essentially the same adopted by Auerbach (1983), King and
Fullerton (1984), Fullerton and Henderson (1984), and the U.S. Treasury
(1984,1985) in their analyses of existing tax distortions.—5-
where F1 is the marginal product of capital of type i.
Private investors will allocate the fixed stock of capital (K) among




The government's proble.isto set tax rates to maximize aggregate output
subject to the government's budget constraint and the constraint that the
available capital will be allocated by investors to equalize net rates of
return. It is immediately clear that the government can achieve this by
setting all tax rates equal. With t1t2t3, the net return equalization
(equations 1.3 and 1.4) Implies that gross returns are also equal:
F1F2F3. Since F1 —F2
-
F3Is the condition for maximizing output In the
absence of a government budget constraint, the government achieves the
first—best allocation by setting all tax rates equal. This is not at all
surprising since with total capital fixed this is equivalent to a lump—sum tax
on capital Income.
Consider now the more general and realistic second-best problem in which
one of the tax rates Is arbitrarily fixed. Specifically, let t10. What is
the optimal relation between t2 and






subject to the further constraint that the investors will equalize after tax
rates of return. With t1 —0,these extra constraints Imply F1 —(1-t2)F2and—6-
F1 —(1-t3)F3.These conditions can be used to rewrite 1.5 without t2 and











Although the government doesnotcontrol the allocation of capital
directly, the choice of t2 and t3 uniquely determines and 1(3. The
government's proble. can therefore be solved by choosing the values of
andK3that maxImize (1.6) and then noting the implications for t2 and t3.






































2.InterpretinQ theSecond BestOptimum Conditions
It is immediatelyclearthat the second-best taxrateson the two types
of taxable capital will not In general be equal. To interpret (1.12), It Is
useful to begin with the simplest case in which the marginal product of each
type ofcapital doesnot depend ontheamountsof theother types of capital
inuse, i.e., F 0 for i j.Themoregeneral case in whichthe different
types of capital maybe substitutes or complements will be considered in the
nextsection.
IfF1 0, for i *j,equation (1.12) becOmes:
(2.1) tF3 F11(K2+K3) 32K2
3 211 2 3 333
Two special cases will point the way to the general implications of this
equation. Consider first the case in which the marginal product of the






(aK2/aF2)F2/K2as the elasticity along the
production function of type 2 capital with respect to its own marginal




This rule tells us to tax capital incomes of type 2 and 3 in a ratio which is
the inverse of the responsiveness of the two capital stocks to changes in themarginal product of capital.
A second interpretation of (2.3) is also familiar from the theory of
Ramsey tax rules: flaw taxes on capital incomes of type 2 and 3 should be
levied in a ratio that causes the two capital stocks to shrink in the same
proportion. To see this note that (2.3) can be rewritten as
dK2F2 dK3F3
(2.4)
2 2 3 3
Since F1 —(1—t2)F2is a condition of investor equilibrium and we are
studying the special case of F11 —0,a change in t2 causes
dF2 —-F2dt2/(1-t2).A new small tax (i.e., approximately dt2 —t2at t2 —0)







The optimum conditions of (2.4) thus imply equiproportlonate decreases in
K2 and K3.
Why does F11 —0imply these results? With F11 —0,the reduced capital
in K2 and K3 can be absorbed as increased K1 with constant productive value,
F1. The entire welfare loss therefore arises because each successive unit of
K2 and K3 has a greater value. The tax rates t2 end t3 must therefore be set
so that K2 and K3 are reducedina mix that minimizes the aggregate loss.
This requires taxing more heavily the capital for which any given tax induces
a smaller reduction in the type of capital. The exact balancing is expressed
by the inverse elasticity rule of (2.4).
Return now to the first order condition of (1.13) end, instead of-9—
assuming F11 — 0, consIder the opposite special case in which —F11 tends to
Infinity. As —F11 Increases, the values of F22 and F33 become relatively less
important as determinants of the optimal tax ratio and t2/t3 tends to F3/F2.
In the limit, t2/t3 — F3/F2 or t2F2 — t3F3. Combining this optimum condition
on the tax rates with the investors' equilibrium condition that
(1—t2)F2 — (1-t3)F3 implies that F2F3 and therefore that t2 — t3. So in
this limiting case it is optimal to tax all of the taxable types of capital
income equally. The reason for this is easy to see. In the limiting case In
which —F11 is infinite, the investor equilibrium that F1 — (1—t2)F2 implies
that K1 cannot change at all (since any finite change in K1 would cause an
infinite change in F1). With K1 fixed, the total K2 +K3is also fixed. The
optimum allocation of a fixed total amount of capital between two different
uses requires equal marginal products In both uses (F2 — F3) and therefore
equal tax rates. Thus, with the capital in the untaxed sector fixed in
quantity and with a separable production technology, the untaxed sector
becomes irrelevant and the problem becomes equivalent to a first—best taxation
question for the taxable sectors of the economy.
Between the two extremes of F11 — 0 and —F11 — ,therelative tax rates
vary monotonically from the inverse elasticity condition of equation (2.3)
when F11 — 0 to the equality of tax rates when -F11co.6 To see this, note
that (2.1) can be rewritten using F1 — (1—t2)F2(1—t3)F3 as:
6lhis assumes that the elasticities do not change In a way that reverses
their relative magnitudes.-10-
t2F2F11(K2+K3)(1—t2)F2F11 + F22K2F2F1
(2.6) tF -1 —1 3 3F11(K2+K3)(1—t3)F3F1 + F33K3F3F3
Factor out F2 from the numerator and F3 from the denominator, multiply










when F11 —0. —— andt2/t3C22/€33 as noted previously. Similarly, as
-F11 tends to , tendsto zero and t2/t3 tends to 1. To show the







Since the sign of - alsodetermines whether t2/t3 < 1 or t2/t3 ) 1,
equatIon (2.9) implies that t2/t3 moves monotonically from t2/t3 —22'33
if
F11 —0to t2/t3 —1as -F11 tends to Infinity.—11—
3.Substitutes and Complements in Production
The simple optimal tax formula of equation (2.1) and the conclusion that
the ratio of the tax rates on the taxable sources of capital income lies between
one and the inverse elasticity ratio depend on the simplifying assumption that
the different types of capital are independent in production, i.e.,F13 —0for
I 3.Thissection of the paper analyzes how relaxing this assumption alters
the second best pattern of taxes.
Note first that even with no restriction on the two tax rates tend
toward equality as —F11 tends to infinity. This result, which is directly
apparent in equation (1.12), occurs for the same reason that it did in the
simpler context in which F13 —0for I * 3. At —F11 —, K1is effectively
constant and can therefore be ignored. The problem is then equivalent to
setting tax rates t2 and t3 as If K2 and K3 were the only types of capital. In
this context, with no restriction on the relevant tax rates, t2 and t3 should be
equalized.
Nore generally, however, the sign and magnitude of theF13 terms influence
the optimal rates of tax on the two types of taxable capital Income. The
analysis in this section shows that the effect of a change in the production
functioncross-product terms, F12and F13, can be decomposed into two
components,a direct "allocation effect" and a secondary "budgeteffect." The
direct "allocation effect" of a change in F12 orF13on the optimal relative
taxation of the two types of taxable capital income is unambiguous: the
relative tax rate on a partIcular type of capital rises if that type of capital
becomes more of a complement with the untaxed good and falls if that type of—12—
capital becomes more of a substitute with the untaxed capital. The Indirect
"budget effect" reflects the fact that a change In F12 or F13 alters the shadow
value of the government's budget constraint, gt. A change In p can either
reinforce the direct allocation effect or shift the optimal tax rates in the
opposite direction. This section derives the explicit expressions for the
allocation effect and the budget effect and discusses the conditions under which
they are reinforcing and those in which they are opposing. The section a1so
considers the implication of these results for two examples: the nontaxation of
housing end the differential taxation of equipment and structures.
The basic results and the decomposition into allocation effects and budget
effects follows directly fro. equations (1.10) and (1.11). Dividing both sides
of these equations by 1 +pand subtracting (1.11) from (1.10) yields an
expression for the difference between the tax per unit of type 2 capital










The first term on the right side of equation (3.2) is unambiguously
positive since p Is the shadow cost of the government budget constraint and
therefore p >0.The second term reflects the effect of a change in the shadow—13—
cost of the government budget constraint. Since It will be shown that
<0,the sign of the "budget effect" Is the opposite of the sign
of 02 —03The Implications of this and the explicit derivation of
<0wIll be presented below. But first I derive the effect of a
change in F13.
It follows immediately from (3.1) that
(3.3) 23 -1 K2.K3)
+
Thedirect allocation effect of an increase In F13 is to reduce 2 —03This
corresponds exactly to equation (3.2) sInceadecrease in -
03means that
93 —2rises with F13.
The economic interpretation of the direct allocation effect Is clear.
Consider first the effect of variations In F12. In comparison to the optimaltax
rates when F12 a. thedirect allocation effect implies that °2 rises relative
to 03 if type2 capitalIs a complement to the untaxed type 1 capital.
Conversely, 2 falls relative to 03 if capital of types 1 and 2 are
substitutes (F12 <0).For example, if the three types of capital are owner
occupied housing (K1), rental housing (K2) and manufacturing capital (K3), It
is reasonable to posit F12 <0and F13 —F23
—0.Since owner-occupied
housing and rental housing are substitutes, the optimal tax on rental housing
is lower relative to the tax on manufacturing capital than it would be if
F12 a0.One way of stating the rationale for this is that a lower tax on
rental housing capital helps to balance the specific distortion in favor of
owner-occupiedhousing.—14-
As a second example, assume that the three types of capital are
manufacturing equipment (K1), manufacturing structures (K2), and housing (K3).
By assumption, let the effective tax rate on manufacturing equipment capital
be zero. It Is reasonable to posit that manufacturing structures and
equipment are complements In production (F12 >0)and that the contribution of
housing capital is independent of both (F13F230). It now follows that
manufacturing structures should be taxedmoreheavily than housing capital
(relative to the optimal tax rates when F12 —0as well). A higher tax on
manufacturing structures raises the overall taxation on manufacturing capital
and thereby reduces the distortion that would otherwise exIst between the
manufacturing sector and the housing sector.
It is clear from equation (3.2) and (3.3) that the direct allocation
effect of variations in F12 and F13 depends on the relative degrees of




Thus, If d2 —dF13,there is no direct allocation effect.
Consider now the effect that works through changes In i.Tobe specific,
I will examine equation (3.2). The value ofaut/1+p)/aF12 can be evaluated








Since R must remain constant at the required level of revenue, it follows that
(3 7)
atu/(1+p)]—— aR/aF12 •-2(--]
aF12 aR/a(M/(1+M)] 1+jz R
Substituting this expression into (3.2) and writing R021(2 +031(3yields
d(e2—e3)— +1-c , - ,1JL.2




It is immediately clear that 03 0impliesd(02—03)/dF12 >0.If 03 <
theeffect of F12 on 02 -93is ambiguous and depends on the relative
magnitudes of the tax rates and capital stocks.
Thesourceof the ambiguity can be explained as follows: An increase in
F12 reduces theoutputloss associated with any given budget requirement
because the taxon is to some extent also an indirect tax on theuntaxable
complement Intheextreme, if 2and had to be used in fixed
proportions, the inability to taxwould be irrelevantand thetax rates on
K2 and 1(3 could be set to avoid any excess burden. This explains why
<0.
Equations (1.10) and (1.11) show that and 03 respOnd to variations in
t/(1+ji) with elasticities equal to one. For example, since equation (1.10)
can be written
(39) 2 —— 1NF11+F22—2F12)K2+
(F11+F32—F31—F12)K3],





Thus If 02 —03.a change In &doesnot alter that equality. But if 02 >03? a
decline in Acauses to decline by more than 03• Since the direct
allocation effect of an increase in F12 Is to raise 02 relative to 03. the
indirect effect that works through a reduction in z has an offsetting effect
if 02 is initially greater than 03• Conversely, if <O,the induced
declinein ireduces03 by morethan and therefore reinforces the direct
allocation effect of an increase in F12. The effects on 02 -03of decreases
in F12 and of variations in F13 can be explained in the same way.
Although the optimal tax rates must in principle be evaluated explicitly
in each case, the expression for d(02-03)/dF12 in equation (3.8) suggests that
the direct allocation effect is likely to dominate the indirect budget effect.
That will not be true and d(02-03)/dF12 <0only if 03(K2+K3) +(03-02)K2
(0.
This requires not only that 02 >03but also that the tax that would be
collected if the lower of the two optimal tax rates were applied to the entire
capital stock (03(K2+K3)) be less than the extra tax collected on the
complementary stock by the differential tax rate ((02-03)K2]. Reversal of the
direct allocation effect therefore requires that the difference In the tax
rates (0203) must be larger than the lower of the tax rates ((02—03) >
andthat this differential must be proportionately greater than the ratio of




Although this inequality could in principle be satisfied, in general it would
not be and the direct allocation effect would dominate.—17—
A final wordisappropriate about the effect of the production
interdependence of K2 and
1(3.It follows from (3.1) that
32 d(e2-e3)- — (l+JA)—au/(1+p)
g.i(K2+K3)
(1+p)(62K2+03K3)(O2k283K3)
Thus an increase in F23, the comple.entarity in production between the two
taxable types of capital, increases -e3 ifmore revenue is initially
collected from type 2 capital. The nature of this result is clear If we focus
on the effect of F23 on the two amounts of taxes collected (e2K2-e31(3)rather
thanthetwo tax rates. Multiplying equation (1.10) by 2andequation (1.11)
by 1(3 and subtracting (1.11) from (1.10) yields
(3.13) e2K2 — — - j[(F11+F22-2F12)K—
(F33+F11—2F13)K].
Since F23 does not appear on the righthand side of this equation, it follows
immediately that the degree of complementarity or substitutability between
and 1(3 does not altertheoptimal difference in taxes collected on these
two typesof capital.
4.ConcludinQ Remarks
This paperhasemphasized that theconventional view thatall taxrates
shouldbe set equal to each other must be modified in the very common situation
in which some tax rate is politically constrained to beat something other than
its optimal value. Although the present analysis has focusedon the-18-
implicationsof not taxing one type of capital income,theresults here could
easily be extended to the case where one type of capital income is taxed at an
arbitrary non—zero rate.
It would be useful to extend the current analysis to explore the
Implicationsof the existence of a corporate inCome tax or the favorable tax
rates on extrective industries and on the capital used by state and local
governments. It would also be desirable to analyze en economy with more than
threekindsof capital so that two or more tax rates could be fixed arbitrarily.
Three general "rules of thumb" type results emerged from the specific
analysis of the present paper. First, if the several types of capital can be
regarded as independent in production, the optimal tax rates on the taxable
types of capital Income should depart from equality in the direction of an
Inverse elasticity rule. Second, in comparison to these rates, capital that Is
a complement to the untaxed capital should generally be taxed more heavily while
capital that Is a substitute to the untaxed capital should be taxed less
heavily. Third, variations in the degree of complementarity or substitutability
between the two types of taxed capital should alterthe twotax rates in a way
thatmaintains a constant difference in the total taxes oneach type of capital
Income.
Although these rule-of-thumb results may help to modify the conventional
equal-tax-rates rule in an appropriate way, it is important to recognize that
they are only rough approximations to the optimal second best taxation of
capital. Perhaps the most Important implication of the present anlaysis is that
any departure from optimal capital taxation makes it very difficult to set other
capital tax rates optimally. That is a further reason for seeking to overcome-19-
political constraints that prevent setting all tax rates optimally. But as long
as such political constraints remain, economists should recognize the limitation
of the simple equal-tax-rates rule and should try to point to the optimal
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